

Staff Department
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia

STUDENT MONOGRAPH
Advanced Infantry Officers Course
Class Nr. 2
1955-56

DEFENSIVE ACTION IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

Capt Emanuel Burack
Roster Nr. 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	2
INTRODUCTION	3
DISCUSSION	
Part 1	5
Part 2	13
CONCLUSIONS	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21
ANNEXES	
A	22
B	24
C	26
D	28

PREFACE

6 February 1956

Unless otherwise noted, the narrative of the historical combat example used in Part 1 of the Discussion is based on descriptions of this action found in the following sources:

The First Commonwealth Division - (Chapter 7 and Appendix D)

The Edge of the Sword - Part I, pp 11 to 67

Now Thrive the Armourers - (Chapters XVI to XX)

Australian Army Journal, March 1952 - pp 21-25

The account of the first night's battle for Hill 800, the historical example used in Part 2 of the Discussion, is based on descriptions of, and references to this action found in the following:

Combat Actions in Korea - (Chapter 14)

Regimental Combat Team Operations of the 9th, 23d and 38th Infantry Regiments During the Battle of the Soyang River - 16 May to 2 June 1951 (Part C)

These sources are listed in the bibliography and may be found in The Infantry School Library.

The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author - not necessarily that of the Infantry School or the Department of the Army.

INTRODUCTION

Victory in war can be achieved only through offensive action. The mission of the Infantry demands the offensive to successfully achieve its ultimate goal of closing with the enemy and, by fire and maneuver, destroying him. However, the Army, and every infantry unit in particular, will at one time or another be required to defend. The reasons for this are many:

Initially, the prompting influence may be the familiar one that put us on the defensive in the early months of World War II and Korea: To give a nation dedicated to never striking the first blow a chance to recover, develop and flex its muscles. We, as soldiers, must always remember that the United States Army does not start wars, it just ends them.

We may be required to maintain the defensive for political reasons. Korea was the first time in our history, but, apparently, we are not to consider it the last, when the Army possessed the offensive ability necessary to successfully end the conflict and was required, instead, to accept a "substitute for victory".

In war, some infantry units will always be on the defensive out of military necessity. It may be to allow the concentration of men and material in other sectors or on other fronts which have been selected as the scenes of decisive offensive action. It may be to draw the enemy into a position more favorable to our counteroffensive. Or, it may be just to stop and consolidate for the night prior to resuming the offensive at daybreak. The tactics and techniques of defense are as fundamentally necessary to the successful infantryman as are those of offense.

The defender seeks terrain favorable to himself. He organizes, if at all possible, on terrain that can be employed to negate the advantages or odds the attacker possesses. Mountainous terrain normally favors the defend-

er. "Regardless of the size or composition of the units involved defensive combat in the mountains has the following advantages:

(1) Dominant terrain provides the defender, and denies the attacker, observation and firing positions.

(2) The slopes and other terrain features impose difficulties on the attacker.

(3) There are zones which are either impassable or extremely difficult for the enemy to negotiate.

(4) The lack, or scarcity, of roads places restrictions on the use of tanks or other combat vehicles, and renders them extremely vulnerable."

(3: 19)

At least one third of the land surface of the earth is actually mountainous. (6) Mountainous terrain is divided into two categories: "Alpine terrain" and "Ordinary mountainous terrain". Alpine terrain consists of mountains which are subject to extreme changes in weather and have slopes which are covered with snow the year round. Roads and trails are few or non-existent in alpine terrain. Troops required to operate in this terrain will be at high altitudes under conditions of low temperature, high winds, ice and snow, and must have specialized training and equipment. (6)

Ordinary mountainous terrain has mountains of a lower altitude with milder temperatures and usually without snow except during the winter months. The standard infantry unit must be capable of operating effectively in this type terrain. Italy in World War II and Korea in the recent "police action" have shown that they can. It is with defense in ordinary mountainous terrain that this paper is concerned.

In the historical examples that will be considered in the next phase of this paper, I have selected for discussion two defensive actions fought by United Nations troops in Korea. These battles were, I believe, representative of many defensive actions that were fought with varying degrees of success.

DISCUSSION
Part 1

During the early days of April, 1951 the Eighth Army in Korea was slowly and methodically advancing north against strong enemy resistance. At the same time intelligence reports began to be received of another buildup of powerful enemy offensive forces within striking distance of the western flank of the United Nations forces. In view of the reported strength of these enemy forces, four North Korean Corps and nine Chinese Communist Armies, there was little the Eighth Army could do but to try and strengthen the new line that they held and brace themselves for the resumption of the enemy attack. (10:58)

During the night of 22 April 1951 the Chinese Communists started their Fifth Phase Offensive against the Eighth Army. The front at the beginning of the offensive ran generally south of Kaesong, Chorwan and Kumhwa. (10:60) One of the prongs of the Chinese offensive was from the direction of Kaesong in the west across the Imjin River, thirty-five miles due north of Seoul, into the area of responsibility of the 29th British Infantry Brigade. Asstride this road to Seoul, the road the Chinese meant to clear quickly and at any cost, stood the eight hundred British soldiers of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment.

The battalion, four rifle companies, a support company with Troop C, 170th Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery, attached, and the battalion headquarters, were deployed in an unbalanced perimeter in the vicinity of a tiny Korean village. This village, located three miles south of the Imjin River, was called Solma-ri. Here the battalion headquarters was situated, grouped around a stream bed. Company C was dug in on a high ridge overlooking Solma-ri. North of Company C, along an extension of the same ridge, Company D occupied a position to the right of, and overlooking, the crossroads village of Choksong. Company B, forward and on the far right,

organized two features which commanded the battalion approaches from the north. Company A, on the left, was situated along a high ridge above Choksong called "Castle Hill". From Castle Hill the Injin River and the Gloucester Ford across it were under direct observation. This ford was shown on the map; the British had improved it and had clearly marked the approaches to it. As far as they knew, it was the only crossing site in their sector. To the rear of the battalion headquarters the Support Company was positioned on a secondary ridge, Hill 235. The Gloucesters held a front of two miles with both flanks exposed. (5:14:1)

Originally, the Chinese plan had been simple. Their patrols had discovered another crossing point to the west of Gloucester Ford which would put them across the river in front of the A Company positions on Castle Hill. By an overwhelming coordinated night assault across the two fording sites, they would destroy A and D Companies. Following this, they planned to destroy or pass beyond our forces holding the approach to Seoul before we knew from which direction their primary thrust would come. Speed in their plan was all important; time was against them. The Chinese realized that if Eighth Army discovered this thrust was their main effort, and they, meanwhile, were forced to deploy completely, our few army reserves, with their superior military skills and equipment, would successfully thwart their effort.

Almost from the start of the action the Chinese plan was disrupted. A sixteen-man ambush patrol covering Gloucester Ford upset their time schedule by many precious hours of darkness. The patrol also destroyed their plan for a coordinated surprise attack against A and D Companies. However, the Chinese, quietly and successfully, crossed the river below Company A. By midnight, they had inched their way, still undetected, to within assault distance of the A Company positions on Castle Hill. Then, they attacked. An hour later the fighting spread to the D Company front as the patrol cover-

ing the Gloucester Ford was forced to withdraw. At first light, after six hours of intense combat, the A Company positions had been overrun and Castle Hill, the highest point in the battalion defensive area, was in Chinese hands.

At dawn on the 23rd, the Chinese were in Choksong in estimated battalion strength. They were also firmly established on Castle Hill from where they repelled a counterattack by the remnants of A Company. (Annex C) The Chinese at this time probably believed that even though behind schedule they could still follow through on their original plan. However, 23 April is St. George's Day. To the men in the Gloucester Battalion it was St. George for England and the Regiment; the dragon now was the dragon of Red China.

During the morning, the positions of A and D Companies had become untenable, so, the battalion commander ordered A, D and B Companies to withdraw to the vicinity of Hill 235 and organize for defense. The withdrawal was covered by intense artillery fire. The Gloucesters were now more concentrated although the front was still nearly 2,000 yards in diameter.

During the afternoon of the 23rd, the Chinese took advantage of their successes against the 1st R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) Division. This division, previously on the left flank of the 29th British Brigade, had been driven back several thousand yards, and, thus, the Chinese were able to outflank the Gloucesters and cut the road behind them. However, the Gloucesters still commanded the road between Choksong and Solma-ri and, therefore, still controlled the road to Seoul.

With darkness came renewed strong enemy attacks. The first attack on the brigade front had been made by the 187th Chinese Division with one regiment directed against the Gloucesters. Now, on the night of 23-24 April, a second enemy division was committed.

Due to the reorganization of A, D and B Companies, the Chinese were not sure of their exact defensive positions. The British used combat patrols

to keep the enemy patrols from pinpointing their battle positions. Consequently, for the first two hours the Chinese made the mistake of attacking obliquely across the front. Only after sustaining great losses did they redirect their line of assault and direction of attack.

The Chinese, with their total disregard for the value of human life, used massed "human sea" formations. Thus, by taking heavy casualties, they overran part of C Company and seized the high ground in the company sector. At about 0300 hours on the 24th, they controlled the valley in which the battalion command post was located. The battalion commander took instant advantage of the Chinese failure to exploit this success. He ordered the command post and the aid station to move up into the front line company positions before dawn. Everything of military value in the valley that couldn't be carried up on the hill was destroyed. These actions were accomplished without any effective interference by the enemy. By this time, B Company who, together with C Company, had borne the brunt of the night's fighting numbered only fifteen men, some of whom were wounded.

During the 24th, the battalion commander ordered the withdrawal from all outlying positions and the battalion concentrated in a small area on Hill 235. The battalion, at this time, numbered less than four hundred effectives. Many of their supporting weapons had been destroyed by enemy fire; they were beginning to feel the shortage of ammunition, radio batteries, food and water. The enemy now also controlled the road, although they could not use it. The Gloucesters still held the high ground commanding the road.

Several attempts were made to air drop supplies and ammunition, but they were not successful; most of the containers fell out of reach. Medical helicopters tried to evacuate the seriously wounded but were brought under intense enemy fire and were forced to withdraw without fulfilling their mission.

It was at this time, after two attempts to rescue the Gloucesters had

failed, that the battalion commander received the order to hold on and continue to deny the road to the enemy.

With the return of darkness on the night 24-25 April, the enemy again attacked in strength. The Gloucesters held. Just prior to daylight the Chinese succeeded in overrunning 235, the highest point in the battalion position. At dawn, the battalion drum major sounded reveille and A Company, now commanded by the battalion adjutant, counterattacked and restored the battle position. The enemy, in broad daylight, now continued to attack the hill. The British with the aid of air strikes and by directing point detonating artillery fire on their own positions, when these positions were about to be overrun, continued to hold the hill. The British called for this fire even though they were in unimproved, open trenches dug the previous afternoon.

During the morning of the 25th, the battalion commander received a message from the brigade commander relieving him of his mission. The United States 1st Cavalry Division was in position to stop the enemy effort which the Gloucesters, now reduced to barely one hundred men, had so effectively blunted.

The battalion, now beyond the range of friendly artillery support, attempted to break out and rejoin the United Nations Forces. Thirty-nine men--the sole survivors of the battalion which had taken part in the battle--made it.

Mountains, by their very nature a series of crests broken up and separated by valleys, generally present the defender with the impossibility of creating a continuous front line. When, in addition to the difficulties of the terrain, there is a shortage of troops, the defense is organized to occupy only the dominant terrain and the controlling mountain passes; thus, in effect, forming strongpoints of resistance along the likely avenues of approach. These strongpoints must be able to continue operations for con-

siderable periods of time without being resupplied. Weather and terrain, in addition to the enemy capability of outflanking and surrounding the strongpoint, make this quality mandatory. If the defending strongpoint is also organized in depth, a breakthrough by the enemy in one sector of the perimeter does not offer him much opportunity for exploitation.

One of the most difficult, nebulous and important tasks facing the commander of a surrounded force is the prevention of a lowering of morale and discipline within his command. He and his leaders must set the example in confidence, enthusiasm and courage since the troops will generally, and particularly in a tight situation, reflect the actions and moods of their officers.

The British organized on the terrain features which they needed to accomplish their mission. They were also organized in depth. However, because of this organization in depth in mountainous terrain, the battalion commander was unable to move an unengaged company to the vicinity of Castle Hill in time to prevent its falling into Chinese hands. The Gloucesters used patrols to provide security against the Chinese advantages of possessing the initiative and the ability to infiltrate. At the same time, they were guilty of misjudging the impassability of the obstacle to their front and not thoroughly checking the Imjin River to find all the foot crossing sites in their sector. They considered only the one shown on their maps (Gloucester Ford). Because of this error the enemy was able to cross the river and attack A Company by surprise.

During the second night's action, the British, having deceived the enemy as to the true location of their new defense line, were able to inflict great losses on the Chinese even before they knew where the main line of resistance was. When the enemy secured a position from which they could bring direct fire to bear on the battalion headquarters and the aid station,

these installations and the many wounded were moved, during darkness, and in about three hours, into the front line positions for protection.

The third night the Gloucesters held and fought against overwhelming odds with nothing in their favor but their personal courage and their unit tradition. This unit tradition cannot be disregarded as a factor in influencing the actions of the battalion. Every man in the regiment wore a reminder on his cap that his predecessors had, in similar circumstances, set an example for him to follow. In 1601, at the Battle of Alexandria, the Gloucesters were surrounded by the French Army which then attacked them to their front and rear simultaneously. The rear files of the regiment did an about face and the regiment defended against attack from all sides. So vigorous was the defense that the French were defeated. For this battle the Gloucesters had conferred upon them the signal honor of being ordered to, henceforth, wear two badges on their caps, one in front and one in back, signifying that they fought back to back against tremendous odds.

Some mention must be made of the morale of these British soldiers and the leadership displayed by their officers. Under constant artillery and mortar fire and repeated mass attacks by vastly superior numbers of enemy, these men stopped the Chinese at close quarters. Even after the battalion was completely cut off, and they realized that regardless of the casualties it cost them the enemy was determined to overrun their position, they continued as a fighting entity complying with orders and accomplishing their assigned mission. General Order number 34, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., dated 29 May 1951, awards the United States Presidential Unit Citation to the battalion. In describing the gallant stand of these British soldiers, the General Order uses descriptive phrases of the action which even the imaginative novelist wouldn't use for fear of sounding unreal. (Annex A)

Throughout the action the battalion officers displayed outstanding lead-

ership and courage. On two separate occasions the battalion commander, armed with a rifle and grenades, personally led assault groups which drove back the enemy and saved important situations. Four awards of the Victoria Cross and two of the George Cross, the British supreme awards for valor, were made to men who served in Korea. (1:217) Three of these were given to officers of the battalion for their actions during, or immediately after, the battle of the Imjin River. Two of the three were posthumous awards. (Annexes B, C and D)

DISCUSSION
Part 2

The First Step of the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive had taken place at the western end of the Eighth Army line. Its mission was the capture of Seoul and the encirclement of United Nations troops in that area. This First Step, which lasted about eight days, failed to accomplish its mission, and by 1 May 1951 the intensity of the enemy attack subsided. However, the enemy, even though he had lost enormous numbers of men, had not exhausted his offensive capabilities.

The Chinese turned almost at once to preparations for the Second Step of their Fifth Phase Offensive. The main effort in this attack was to take place in the eastern sector of the front. The plan now called for (through the use of even more overwhelming and concentrated manpower) the penetration of the defensive positions of the 2nd United States Infantry Division; the destruction of this unit and its flanking R.O.K. Divisions, and a drive straight down Korea to the port of Pusan.

The defense sector of the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, was about four miles wide. The battalion, which was on the left of the regimental sector, anchored its defense to Hill 800, the prominent hill mass in its assigned area. K Company was made responsible for the defense of Hill 800.

Hill 800 was slightly more than ten miles from the main supply route and was reached by a single lane dirt road which followed the curves of a small tributary of the Hongchon River. All the supplies and equipment needed had to be hand carried to the top of the hill, some 1,600 feet above the end of the road. A herd of thirty-two oxen and seven hundred Korean civilians were assigned to the battalion to aid them in carrying the required supplies to their positions. "During the period of preparation, they moved 237,000 sand bags to the top of the hill; 385 rolls of barbed wire; almost 2,000 long steel pickets for installing wire aprons; and nearly 4,000 short

ones; and 39 55-gallon fougasse drums.....This equipment was in addition to the normal supplies -- rations, cans of water and ammunition. It required eight Korean men to carry one fougasse drum up the hill; one man could carry a roll of barbed wire or a box of rations. A round trip took three or four hours." (4:178) The oxen were used primarily to transport a section of 4.2 inch mortars and to stockpile mortar ammunition.

The battalion prepared its defensive sector. The men labored painstakingly to make their positions the strongest they had ever occupied. The battalion commander's defense plan included the use of friendly air burst artillery fire on his own positions if it should become necessary. He forced his companies to construct bunkers strong enough to protect them from this fire. "On 10 May the commander of Eighth Army (Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet) and the commander of X Corps (Lt. Gen. E. M. Almond) landed by helicopter on Hill 800 and declared the 3rd Battalion's preparations to be the most formidable in X Corps' sector." (4:178)

Twelve hundred yards to the north of Company K's positions on Hill 800 was Hill 916. Instead of the usual steep ravine, a smooth saddle connected these two hills. This saddle was the most likely enemy avenue of approach. K Company placed two barbed wire aprons across its end of the saddle and planted antipersonnel mines and trip flares between the aprons. On top of Hill 800 the company had twenty-three bunkers. Other company positions were located along the ridgelines that sloped down to the southwest and southeast.

On the night of 16 May 1951 the enemy launched the Second Step, Fifth Phase Offensive. This offensive was started by twenty-one Chinese Communist Divisions and nine North Korean Divisions. (10:63) The attack did not reach K Company until the 17th. With the enemy assault expected immediately after dark, the company made its final last minute preparations. The only apparent weakness in its positions was its extensive front and the uncompleted pre-

arranged close support artillery concentrations. The company commander located his command post in a bunker at the point of his defense sector. His command group, with the exception of the artillery forward observer, was with him.

At about 2200 hours the enemy attack began as expected, along the saddle in front of Hill 800. As the Chinese reached the first wire apron, one hundred yards from the line of K Company bunkers, they opened fire. K Company held its fire until the enemy reached the second wire barrier. The company commander tried to bring in artillery fire, but the telephone line between his command post and the artillery forward observer's bunker was cut within a few minutes after the attack started. Almost simultaneously, the company commander's lines to his 1st Platoon and to battalion failed. They were cut either by enemy soldiers or by the Chinese mortar and artillery fire which had become intense. The company had not buried its telephone lines.

Personnel from M Company's machine gun and 75mm recoilless rifle platoon had been attached to K Company. These men were in positions on top of the hill between the two front line platoons (1st and 3rd), from which they could cover the dangerous likely enemy avenue of approach. The M Company lieutenant commanding these men, suddenly, in panic, gave the order to his men to get out. In the darkness and through the heavy enemy fire, he left his bunker and headed towards the rear. About twenty of his men followed.

At this time, the K Company Commander had no communications at all. Shortly after he was informed by the 1st Platoon runner of the break in his defense line, the radio, his sole remaining means of communication, was damaged by an enemy shell which landed on top of the command post bunker. With no means of communication to the company commander, and with the enemy coming over the top of Hill 800 through the former M Company positions, K Company's line disintegrated. The men from one bunker after another began falling back.

Fortunately, two men in a bunker just to the left of the top of the hill were able to contact battalion by soundpowered telephone. They calmly reported the existing situation as they saw it to the battalion commander. The colonel asked them if they could adjust artillery fire where they knew the Chinese to be, with the understanding that because of the confused situation, care must be used so that no rounds fell on the battle positions. These two men, with no previous experience in the adjustment of artillery, effectively adjusted fire and helped seal off the battle position from further enemy reinforcements.

Meanwhile, the company commander hurried to the command post of the 3rd Platoon. This bunker still had communications with battalion headquarters. He called the battalion commander, reported the loss of the point of his hill, and requested permission to use his 2nd Platoon, the reserve, in a counterattack. The colonel granted this request and the captain moved it into position for the attack.

The counterattacking force was composed of the company commander, the platoon leader, another company officer and thirty-six enlisted men. It started forward in a line of skirmishers, and although unsupported by artillery fire, advanced steadily. The Chinese tried to stop them with machine gun fire and grenades, but the platoon, guided by the three officers and firing steadily, continued on. By 0130, 18 May, the counterattacking force had retaken Hill 800. Company K immediately reorganized and consolidated its position. "Communications were restored and artillery and 4.2 inch mortar fire was concentrated on the saddle leading to Hill 916. Nothing else happened on Hill 800 for the rest of the night." (h:185)

With daylight on 18 May, Company K screened and cleared Hill 800. They found a considerable number of Chinese bodies and many enemy weapons and pieces of equipment.

NOTE

SORRY FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE

**PAGE 17 WAS OMITTED FROM THE ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT**

STAFF

DONOVAN RESEARCH LIBRARY

to use and the latter too slow to use. Wire, the most reliable means, must be backed up by radio and visual signaling. Great effort must be made to see that the wire "stays in". In the defense, communication wire should be buried deep enough so that it will not be cut by surface fragments or enemy patrols. There must be two or more lines, laid over different routes, connecting field telephones to switchboards. If a position is important enough to have a phone, then it is worth the work on the wire necessary to insure that the phone will be available when it is needed most.

For a successful defense in mountains, especially during darkness, a unit must have strong, determined leaders, particularly at the lower levels. When a small unit leader fails in a situation where control is decentralized, the effects on the defense can be very serious.

Mountain warfare offers great opportunity for success to the aggressive unit which takes immediate advantage of the enemy's failures, even though the enemy is numerically superior. The aggressively led and well executed counterattack by the understrengthened 2nd Platoon of K Company restored the vital battle position.

The Chinese initially were successful in their efforts against Company K, even though the company occupied a very strong defensive position. The defenders made errors, some of them serious, in both the planning for and the conduct of the defense. However, once the counterattack restored the battle position during the night of 17 May, Company K began to function in a superior manner. During the night of 18-19 May, the enemy attacked again but were repulsed with great losses. When daylight came on the 19th, the men of Company K were in full possession of Hill 800, their hill.

CONCLUSION

The war in Korea did not teach us any completely new military lessons concerning defense in mountains. Rather, the well known tactical considerations were once again proven to be correct. When defending in mountains, the commander must force himself to observe the fundamentals of defense as opposed to trying to cover his whole front with men and fire.

He must use the terrain as carefully as he uses his weapons. In mountains where roads are few and the ground between the roads is extremely difficult, if not impassable to tracked and wheeled vehicles, the key to successful defense is control of the heights commanding these routes of movement. The commander should bear in mind the fact that the restriction on mobility and movement imposed by the terrain affects him just as it does the enemy. He should particularly take this into account when positioning his reserve and preparing his logistic support plans. Distances should be measured in the time it takes to get from one place to another, rather than in ground space between the two points.

Communications play an important role in providing flexibility in mountains, and the commander must give it a high priority in his planning and supervision. Wire and radio nets should be supplemented by specific plans for the use of visual signaling.

In mountains, the fundamentals of security, defense in depth and all-around defense can best be satisfied by using the perimeter defense. Again and again the defensive battles fought in Korea proved the value of establishing self-contained and mutually supported positions in depth, with a coordinated fire plan to cover the gaps, rather than attempting to maintain a long, thin line. Every possible device is needed to give early warning of an enemy attack. The terrain offers many vantage points for both obser-

vation and ambush, and the defender should take advantage of this.

Ground defense in mountains is characterized by centralized planning and decentralized control and execution. It is the infantryman's war, and his chief supporting arm is the artillery. Subordinate unit leaders (battalion commanders down to squad leaders) must possess, to a high degree, initiative, aggressiveness, determination and resourcefulness. These leaders will often be given, and must always be ready to assume, more responsibility than in other normal terrain. The key individual in mountain defense is the infantry subordinate unit commander. The way he leads his men and plans and conducts the defense will determine the overall success or failure of the mission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Burley, G. H., The First Commonwealth Division (Aldershot, England: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954) DS917.23 .27 bU
2. Farrer-Holtby, A., The Edge of the Sword (London, England: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1954) DS917.123 .298 bU
3. FM 70-10. Mountain Operations (Washington, D. C.: War Department, September, 1947)
4. Gugeler, R. A., Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, D. C.: Association of the U. S. Army, 1954) DS917.79 .093 bU
5. Holles, R. O., Now Thrive the Armourers (London, England: George G. Harrop and Co Ltd., 1952) DS917.69 .6787 bU
6. Miscellaneous Film 7-8278. Infantry in Mountain Operations (Signal Corps, U. S. Army)
7. Munroe, C. C., The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea 1950-1951 (Tokyo, Japan: Toppan Printing Co., Ltd., 1951)
8. Rathbun, F. F., Rifle Squad and Platoon in Defense (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1955) UD157.3 .R18 bU
9. Regimental Combat Team Operations of the 9th, 23d and 38th Infantry Regiments During the Battle of the Soyang River, 16 May--2 June 1951 DS917.834 .U2002 dC
Part C (X Corps, U. S. Eighth Army) (CONFIDENTIAL)
10. Thomas, R. C. W., The War in Korea (Aldershot, England: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954) DS917.2 .T36 bU
11. "To the Last Man and the Last Round" Australian Army Journal, pp 21-25, March, 1952 (CONFIDENTIAL)

CG 34

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington 25, D. C., 29 May 1951

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE FOLLOWING is authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. III, 50 USC, 1941), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, 50 USC, 1941), citation of the following unit in the general orders designated is confirmed in accordance with AR 260--15 in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

The 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, British Army, and Troop C, 170th Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery, attached, are cited for exceptionally outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the armed enemy near Solma-ri, Korea, on 23, 24, and 25 April 1951. The 1st Battalion and Troop C were defending a very critical sector of the battle front during a determined attack by the enemy. The defending units were overwhelmingly outnumbered. The 63rd Chinese Communist Army drove the full force of its savage assault at the positions held by the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, and attached unit. The route of supply ran southeast from the battalion between two hills. The hills dominated the surrounding terrain northwest of the Imjin River. Enemy pressure built up on the battalion front during the day, 23 April. On 24 April, the weight of the attack had driven the right flank of the battalion back. The pressure grew heavier and heavier and the battalion and attached unit were forced into a perimeter defense on Hill 235. During the night, heavy enemy forces had bypassed the staunch defenders and closed all avenues of escape. The courageous soldiers of the battalion and attached unit were holding the critical route selected by the enemy for one column of the gen-

eral offensive designed to encircle and destroy I Corps. These gallant soldiers would not retreat. As they were compressed tighter and tighter in their perimeter defense, they called for close-in air strikes to assist in holding firm. Completely surrounded by tremendous numbers, these indomitable, resolute, and tenacious soldiers fought back with unsurpassed fortitude and courage. As ammunition ran low and the advancing herds moved closer and closer, these splendid soldiers fought back viciously to prevent the enemy from overrunning the position and moving rapidly to the south. Their heroic stand provided the critically needed time to regroup other I Corps units and block the southern advance of the enemy. Time and again efforts were made to reach the battalion, but the enemy strength blocked each effort. Without thought of defeat or surrender, this heroic force demonstrated superb battlefield courage and discipline. Every yard of ground they surrendered was covered with enemy dead until the last gallant soldier of the fighting battalion was overpowered by the final surge of the enemy masses. The 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, British Army, and Troop C, 170th Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery, displayed such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in accomplishing their mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set them apart and above other units participating in the same battle. Their sustained brilliance in battle, their resoluteness, and extraordinary heroism are in keeping with the finest traditions of the renowned military forces of the British Commonwealth, and reflect unsurpassed credit on these courageous soldiers and their homeland. (General Orders 286, Headquarters, Eighth United States Army Korea, 8 May 1951.)

* * * * *

AN EXTRACT COPY

Emmanuel Burack
EMANUEL BURACK, Captain, Infantry

ANNEX B (Award of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant-Colonel James Power Carne)

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMES POWER CARNE, D.S.O. (33647)
The Gloucestershire Regiment

On the night 22nd/23rd April, 1951, Lieutenant-Colonel Carne's battalion, 1 Glosters, was heavily attacked and the enemy on the Imjin River were repulsed, having suffered heavy casualties. On 23rd, 24th and 25th April, 1951, the Battalion was heavily and incessantly engaged by vastly superior numbers of enemy, who repeatedly launched mass attacks, but were stopped at close quarters.

During the 24th and 25th April, 1951, the Battalion was completely cut off from the rest of the Brigade, but remained a fighting entity, in face of almost continual onslaughts from an enemy who were determined, at all costs and regardless of casualties, to over-run it. Throughout, Lieutenant-Colonel Carne's manner remained coolness itself, and on the wireless, the only communication he still had with Brigade, he repeatedly assured the Brigade Commander that all was well with his Battalion, that they could hold on and that everyone was in good heart.

Throughout the entire engagement, Lieutenant-Colonel Carne, showing a complete disregard for his own safety, moved among the whole Battalion under very heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, inspiring the utmost confidence and the will to resist, amongst his troops.

On two separate occasions, armed with a rifle and grenades, he personally led assault parties which drove back the enemy and saved important situations.

Lieutenant-Colonel Carne's example of courage, coolness and leadership was felt not only in his own Battalion, but throughout the whole Brigade.

He fully realized that his flanks had been turned, but he also knew that the abandonment of his position would clear the way for the enemy to make a major break-through and this would have endangered the Corps.

(Award of the Victoria Cross)

When at last it was apparent that his Battalion would not be relieved and on orders from higher authority, he organized his Battalion into small, officer-led parties, who then broke out, whilst he himself in charge of a small party fought his way out, but was captured within 24 hours.

Lieutenant-Colonel Carne showed powers of leadership which can seldom have been surpassed in the history of our Army.

He inspired his officers and men to fight beyond the normal limits of human endurance, in spite of overwhelming odds and ever-increasing casualties, shortage of ammunition and of water. -- London Gazette, 27th October, 1953.

(Award of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Philip Kenneth Edward Curtis)
had they done so, the eventual withdrawal of the company might well have
proved impossible.

Lieutenant Curtis's conduct was magnificent throughout this bitter battle. -- London Gazette, 1st December, 1953.

ANNEX D (Award of the George Cross to Lieutenant Terence Edward Waters)

LIEUTENANT TERENCE EDWARD WATERS (463718)
The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own),
attached The Gloucestershire Regiment
(Posthumous)

Lieutenant Waters was captured subsequent to the Battle of the Imjin River, 22nd-25th April, 1951. By this time he had sustained a serious wound in the top of the head and yet another most painful wound in the arm as a result of this action.

On the journey to Pyongyang with other captives, he set a magnificent example of courage and fortitude in remaining with wounded other ranks on the march, whom he felt it his duty to care for to the best of his ability.

Subsequently, after a journey of immense hardship and privation, the party arrived at an area west of Pyongyang adjacent to P.W. Camp 12 and known generally as "The Caves," in which they were held captive. They found themselves imprisoned in a tunnel driven into the side of a hill through which a stream of water flowed continuously, flooding a great deal of the floor in which were packed a great number of South Korean and European prisoners of war in rags, filthy, crawling with lice. In this cavern a number died daily from wounds, sickness, or merely malnutrition; they fed on two small meals of boiled maize daily. Of medical attention there was none.

Lieutenant Waters appreciated that few, if any, of his numbers would survive these conditions, in view of their weakness and the absolute lack of attention for their wounds. After a visit from a North Korean Political Officer, who attempted to persuade them to volunteer to join a prisoner-of-war group known as "Peace Fighters" (that is, active participants in the propaganda movement against their own side) with a promise of better food, of medical treatment and other amenities as a reward for such activity -- an offer that was refused unanimously -- he decided to order his men to

(Award of the George Cross)

pretend to accede to the offer in an effort to save their lives. This he did, giving the necessary instructions to the senior other rank with the British party, Sergeant Hoper, that the men would go upon his order without fail.

Whilst realizing that this act would save the lives of his party, he refused to go himself, aware that the task of maintaining British prestige was vested in him.

Realizing that they had failed to subvert an officer with the British party, the North Koreans now made a series of concerted efforts to persuade Lieutenant Waters to save himself by joining the camp. This he steadfastly refused to do. He died a short time after.

He was a young, inexperienced officer, comparatively recently commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, yet he set an example of the highest gallantry. -- London Gazette, 13th April, 1954